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Under Feres v. United States,1 the government and its military officials
are immune from tort claims by military personnel for harms arising out
of military service. The Feres doctrine began as a reasonable rule: The
government could not be sued, under 50 different state-law rules, for acci-
dental injuries to soldiers who were already covered by military benefits.
But since 1950 the Feres doctrine has grown into something quite differ-
ent from the original rule. A list of the various claims barred today by the
Feres doctrine illustrates: black servicemen claiming racially discrimina-
tory punishments and duty assignments by a superior officer;
2 a service-
woman claiming to have been sexually assaulted by a superior;
3 an army
intelligence agent found dead after allegedly being confined and interro-
gated for nine days by Army and CIA agents who had learned of his
intention to write his memoirs;4 soldiers subjected to experimental injec-
tions of LSD;5 thousands of soldiers ordered to participate in atomic radi-
ation experiments.' If this is the necessary outcome of the rule, it no
longer appears so reasonable. Rather, it seems to say that the military has
the power of life and death over its personnel, with no limit recognized in
the constitution or a tort claim.
The courts cannot mean that the military has such far-reaching author-
ity; instead, the implicit rationale for the Feres doctrine is the belief that
intramilitary procedures can perform the public tort law functions of com-
pensation and deterrence, while protecting the military's interest in main-
taining discipline, far more effectively than federal courts can. In this note
I argue that, in fact, the military remedies do not adequately deter, or
even compensate for, egregious military misconduct. I then propose re-
placing the overly restrictive Feres doctrine with a general rule of al-
L. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
2. See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
3. See Stubbs v. United States, 744 F.2d 58 (11th Cir. 1984).
4. See Sigler v. LeVan, 485 F. Supp. 185 (D. Md. 1980).
5. See Stanley v. CIA, 639 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1981); Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Supp.
344 (D.D.C. 1979).
6. See, e.g., Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226 (3rd Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 457
U.S. 1133 (1982).
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lowing intentional or constitutional tort claims by former servicemen or
their families. This proposal would permit the claims against more serious
misconduct to go forward, while still showing a measure of deference to
the military's internal remedies and to its need for discipline.
I. MILITARY REMEDIES AS PART OF A SYSTEM OF PUBLIC TORT
LAW
Despite the Feres doctrine's bar of all intramilitary tort claims, the un-
derlying rationale suggests a theory of public tort law that recognizes that
the soldier's relationship to the military may give rise to tort liability.
However, the military's system of remedies cannot fully compensate vic-
tims and deter perpetrators of egregious misconduct.
A. The Feres Doctrine
The Feres doctrine forecloses the two avenues by which citizens can sue
the government.7 Feres v. United States8 held that the federal government
was not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") for injuries
to servicemen "arising out of or in the course of military duty."' The
Court relied predominantly on three considerations in reaching its result.
First, the purpose of the FTCA was not to create new causes of action,
but to make the United States liable "in the same manner and to the same
extent as private individuals under like circumstances." 10 Because, accord-
ing to the Court, there was no pre-existing American law of intramilitary
negligence, the FTCA should not be construed to create it.1" Second, be-
7. First, plaintiffs alleging tortious conduct violating constitutional rights have recourse to reme-
dies implied directly under the constitution. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388
(1971). Bivens claims are brought directly against individual officials, who are protected by official
immunity, but not sovereign immunity. Second, suits can be brought against the government under the
Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), which waives sovereign immunity. 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified
in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). See infra note 69.
8. 340 U.S. 135 (1950). Feres involved a suit for negligence by the wife of a serviceman who was
killed when his barracks burned down. The Court, in hearing the case, consolidated it with two
medical malpractice cases by servicemen against their army doctors, Jefferson v. United States, 178
F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949), and Griggs v. United States, 178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949).
9. 340 U.S. at 146. But see Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949) (allowing FTCA recov-
ery by two enlisted men injured while on furlough when military truck collided with their car onpublic highway, because injuries not "incident to service"). See also United States v. Brown, 348 U.S.
110 (1954) (former serviceman allowed to sue United States for post-discharge negligence of Army
doctors). The tension between Brooks and Brown, on the one hand, and Feres, on the other, has
created some anomalous results. See Molsbergen v. United States, 757 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1985)
(government liable for failure to warn servicemen of radiation exposure after discharge, though not
liable if failure to warn occurred prior to discharge from service); Thornwell v. United States, 471 F.
Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979) (military held liable for post-discharge negligent failure to treat ex-soldier
known to have been given experimental doses of LSD, though not liable for tort of administering
LSD to begin with), and cases discussed infra note 90.
10. 340 U.S. at 141 (quoting FTCA, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982)).
11. Since Feres, the Court has held the federal government liable under the FTCA for negligent
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cause the FTCA adopted "the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred," the federal government's liability would be subject to various
standards. Since the relationship between the government and its service-
men is "distinctively federal in character"
12-it is governed by federal
law, and the stationing of servicemen in the several states is random-the
Court believed that "[iut would hardly be a rational plan" for Congress to
subject the government to various state standards of liability to military
personnel "dependent upon geographic considerations."" Finally, the ex-
istence of a "simple, certain and uniform compensation scheme for injuries
or death of those in the armed services" made additional FTCA recovery
inappropriate.
1 4
More recently, the Feres doctrine has been expanded to bar intentional
and constitutional tort claims against individual officials. In Jaffee v.
United States, 5 former servicemen sued the government and various civil-
ian and military officials, alleging that their exposure to radiation from
their participation in training maneuvers at nuclear testing sites" caused
conduct of activities in which private persons do not or cannot engage. See United 
States v. Muniz,
374 U.S. 150 (1963) (federal prison officials); Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 
352 U.S. 315 (1957)
(government firefighters); Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955) 
(coast guard light-
house operation).
12. 340 U.S. at 143 (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 
(1947)).
13. 340 U.S. at 143.
14. Id. at 144-45. Feres did not discuss the issue of military discipline, even though such 
concerns
had been raised by the court of appeals in one of the companion cases to Feres. 
See Jefferson v.
United States, 178 F.2d 518, 520 (4th Cir. 1949). The Supreme Court later read 
the discipline ra-
tionale into the Feres decision in United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 
(1954) (emphasizing
"peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the effects of the maintenance of such
suits on discipline, and the extreme results that might obtain if suits. . . were 
allowed for negligent
orders given or negligent acts committed in the course of military duty"), and Stencel 
Aero Engineer-
ing Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977) (prospect of "second-guessing military 
orders"
and requiring "members of the Armed Services to testify in court as to each other's 
decisions and
actions" weighed against claim by manufacturer for indemnity against United States 
under FTCA in
connection with injury of National Guard pilot whose plane had malfunctioned).
15. 663 F.2d 1226 (3rd Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1133 (1982).
16. Jaffee was the leading case arising out of a series of on-ground nuclear weapons 
tests con-
ducted by the Atomic Energy Commission ("AEC") and the military. Between 1945 
and 1962, an
estimated 250,000 United States military personnel were exposed to large doses of 
radiation while
participating in maneuvers designed to determine the effectiveness of combat troops 
in nuclear battle-
field conditions. Veterans' Claims for Disabilities from Nuclear Weapons Testing: Hearing 
Before
the Senate Comm. on Veterans Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited 
as Veterans
Exposure Hearing]; Favish, Radiation Injury and the Atomic Veteran: Shifting the Burden 
of Proof
on Factual Causation, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 933 (1981); Hughe & Konigsburg, Grim Legacy 
of Nu-
clear Testing, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1979, § 6 (Magazine), at 34. For a particularly 
gripping account,
see T. SAFFER & 0. KELLY, COUNTDOWN ZERO: GI VICrIMS OF U.S. AToMIC TESTING (1982).
Soldiers were typically positioned one to three miles from nuclear detonations ranging 
from ten
kilotons to one megaton. In many cases, soldiers would approach ground zero within minutes 
or hours
of detonation. They were issued no protective equipment (as were AEC civilian personnel), 
and were
not warned as to the possible dangers of radiation. They were typically instructed 
to cover their eyes
with their forearms at detonation. According to first-hand accounts, soldiers with their 
eyes shut could
see the bones in their forearms at the moment of the explosion. See T. SAFFFR & 
0. KELLEY, supra,
at 43, 75, 152.
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severe, long-term injuries to themselves and their families.1" The plaintiffs
claimed intentional misconduct on the part of the military, not mere negli-
gence as in Feres.18 Their arguments were based in part on the premise
that the military does not have the authority to command its soldiers to act
as subjects in an experiment on the effects of radiation. But the courts in
Jaffee and similar cases have rejected these arguments and held that the
Feres rationale applies whether the defendant is an individual or the gov-
ernment, whether the injury was merely negligent or intentional, and
whether a constitutional violation may have occurred or not. 9 These deci-
sions have emphasized the Feres court's belief that the existence of a com-
pensation scheme for military injuries obviated the need for additional tort
recovery, but they have also relied a great deal on a concern for military
discipline.
20
Although the Supreme Court has not ruled on any of the "Atomic Vet-
erans" cases, it did employ the Feres doctrine to dismiss a constitutional
tort claim in which black sailors alleged injurious racial discrimination by
their superior officers. In Chappell v. Wallace,21 the Court held broadly
17. The servicemen themselves have suffered from inoperable cancer and leukemia, as well as a
variety of non-malignant disorders, all of which have occurred in disporportionate numbers for the
victims' age cohort. The litigation has also included claims by surviving family members, see, e.g.,
Laswell v. Brown, 683 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1210 (1983) (barring survi-
vors' cause of action for injury to serviceman which was itself barred by Feres), and claims by wives
and children alleging that genetic damage from the radiation caused miscarriages and birth defects.
See, e.g., Hinkie v. United States, 715 F.2d 96, 97 (3rd Cir. 1983) (claims barred under Feres because
they were "derivative" of or had their "genesis" in the intramilitary tort); Lombard v. United States,
690 F.2d 215, 223 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (same); Monaco v. United States, 661 F.2d 129, 133 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989 (1982) (same); see generally Note, The Feres Doctrine: Should it
Apply to Atomic Veterans' Children?, 16 IND. L. REv. 753 (1983). Plaintiffs have also alleged that
inadequate follow-up treatment or failure to warn victims of their potential injuries constituted sepa-
rate, post-discharge torts. See infra note 90.
18. Arguably, the Feres opinion recognized that intramilitary intentional torts were a separate
class of cases from negligence claims; and that, unlike intramilitary negligence, there was precedent
for allowing soldiers to recover damages against their superiors for intentional injuries. See 340 U.S.
at 141 n.10 (citing Dinsman v. Wilkes, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 390 (1851) (allowing seaman to recover
from superior for assault and false imprisonment in course of naval mission)).
The Supreme Court has never decided whether Feres would bar intentional torts under the FTCA,
probably because the FTCA did not make the United States liable for intentional torts until the 1974
amendments, Pub. L. No. 93-253, 88 Stat. 50 (1974) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1982)), and
then only for intentional torts of law-enforcement officials. But cf Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296
(1983) (Feres rationale precludes creation of intramilitary damage action for constitutional tort).
19. See, e.g., Gaspard v. United States, 713 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1983) and cases cited supra note
17.
20. A Bivens remedy is precluded by the existence of "an alternative remedy which [Congress]
explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly under the constitution and viewed as equally
effective," Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1980) (emphasis in original), or of "special factors
counselling hesitation," Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396; Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. at 19; Davis v. Passman,
442 U.S. 228, 246 (1979). The courts' expansive power to create a Bivens remedy was restricted by
Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983) (though not necessarily "equally effective," civil service remedies
were adequate substitute for Bivens remedy for alleged First Amendment violation by government
employers, despite lack of explicit congressional declaration to that effect).
21. 462 U.S. 296 (1983). The plaintiffs, Wallace and four other black sailors, alleged that the
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that military personnel may not maintain damage suits against their
superiors for alleged constitutional violations. Purporting to rely on Feres
for guidance, the Chappell court found that "Itihe need for special regula-
tions in relation to military discipline, and the consequent need and justi-
fication for a special and exclusive system of military justice," as well as
the need to condition the rights of soldiers "to meet certain overriding
demands of discipline and duty," precluded the recognition of a constitu-
tional tort action by military personnel against their superiors.
22
None of the cases in the Feres line successfully articulates a clear and
consistent rationale for barring these suits. Most refer to the existence of
the military compensation scheme regardless of whether the particular
plaintiff was actually eligible for compensation. The cases after Feres rely
on the deleterious effect on discipline of allowing suits against superior
officers or the government, but do not explain what that discipline consists
of, why it is so important, or how it would be affected by such suits.
Finally, the more recent cases, beginning with Chappell, rely on internal
channels through which the military disciplines its own members, without
inquiring whether those remedies are competent to address the issues
raised when the military violates civilian norms. Viewed in their most
coherent light, the Feres doctrine cases seem to stand for the proposition
that the balance between soldiers' personal rights and military "disci-
pline" is best achieved by the schemes of compensation and justice already
existing within the military establishment.
2" The problem with the Feres
captain and junior officers on their ship had given them punitive work details, 
unjustified punish-
ments and poor performance ratings, and that these officers also failed to investigate 
incidents of racial
harrassment, such as the scrawling of KKK graffiti on the bulkheads and work areas. 
Brief for Re-
spondent at 2-3.
22. 462 U.S. at 300. Chappell interpreted the "distinctively federal" character of intramilitary
relations, Feres, 340 U.S. at 143, to mean "the unique relationship between the 
Government and
military personnel." Chappell, 462 U.S. at 299 (emphasis added). In doing so, the 
Court seems to
have shifted emphasis from one of the the rationales in Feres-a concern about 
various state-law
liability standards-to a concern for military discipline. This shift in emphasis is not 
surprising, since
the concern about various state-law negligence standards is obviated in the context of a Bivens claim,
which implicates a uniform federal common law.
23. Chappell and Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, were decided the same day. Taken together, 
they
seem to indicate an effort to preclude Bivens remedies where the plaintiff is a federal 
employee and
adequate alternative complaint procedures exist. See supra note 20. Yet it is a mistake 
to read the
sweep of these cases too broadly. The plaintiff in Bush was fired in retaliation for 
exercising what he
believed to be his First Amendment rights, and the complaint procedure deemed adequate 
in Bush
was an administrative review system explicitly designed to deal with personnel actions. 
Whatever one
might think of an administrative tribunal's competence to decide First Amendment 
questions, it is
significant that the plaintiff won his administrative appeal and was awarded reinstatement 
with back
pay. 462 U.S. at 371. The Court noted that 47% of those who appealed demotions and 
24% of those
who contested removal succeeded before the Civil Service Commission. Id. at 386 n.29. 
The complaint
procedure in Bush, then, appeared meaningful and well-tailored to the complaint. Arguably, 
the com-
plaint in Chappell, too, comes under the rubric of a personnel action. However well-tailored 
the
military complaint procedure may be to deal with "personnel" problems, though, 
it is probably not
well-suited to resolve tort claims (and perhaps not racial discrimination claims either). 
See supra notes
38-41 and accompanying text.
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doctrine, however, is that it sweeps too many qualitatively distinct tort
claims under its bar, without regard for the actual adequacy of intramili-
tary remedies to resolve a particular claim.
B. Feres and Public Tort Law
Public tort law2' attempts to encourage vigorous conduct of governmen-
tal activities while compensating victims of those activities and deterring
wrongful conduct by officials. 5 These tort law functions should be imple-
mented in a way that preserves institutional competence.2" Indeed, the
Feres doctrine arguably reflects the belief of federal courts that military
remedies have greater competence to resolve intramilitary tort questions.
At first glance, the relationship of soldiers to the military appears to be
one that would not give rise to tort liability. The military is assigned the
unique and special mission of defending the nation through combat. To
perform this function, it is granted a degree of authoritarian control over
its personnel that our liberal democratic state may not typically exercise
over law-abiding citizens. In particular, military authorities are empow-
ered to impose a high risk of serious physical harm on troops by ordering
them into combat. The discipline underlying effective military force is
thought to require restrictions on soldiers' personal freedom and accept-
ance of a certain degree of physical harshness and brutality in their living
environment. In sum, the military enterprise appears to stand above other
governmental activities in both the incidence of harm to its personnel and
the diminution of the rights of those personnel.
24. Public tort law is a system of rights and remedies for citizens who have been harmed by the
activity of government officials. Tort law, public or private, has been conceived of as a system for
distributing the costs of activities that are socially necessary or desirable, while reinforcing social
norms by deterring conduct deemed wrongful. See G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDErs: A
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 35-129 (1970). Where activities are socially desirable but inevita-
bly cause some injuries, tort compensation provides a way of restoring the victim somewhat while
assessing the accident cost to the tortfeasor's activity. This "general" or "market" deterrence is a way
of insuring that accident costs are counted into activities and affect the amount or degree to which that
activity will be conducted. See id. at 69. Where an activity violates a moral norm, it is singled out for
"specific" deterrence, meaning that it is made subject to penalties intended by society to carry the
message that the activity should not be conducted, even if the actor is willing to bear additional costs
to conduct it. See id. at 97. Specific deterrence remedies may include declaratory judgments, punitive
damage awards, or injunctions.
25. See P. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 16-25
(1983).
26. Id. at 16, 23-24. "Institutional competence" refers to the resolution of remedial claims by the
institution that has sufficient authority, power, information and legitimacy to implement the remedy
effectively-in a way that optimally balances the conflicting goals of public tort law. For example, a
civilian court's deference to intramilitary remedial procedures on the ground that the military
"knows" more about the requirements of discipline reflects a particular view of institutional compe-
tence. On the other hand, this Note argues that civilian courts are a more "legitimate," and thus
"institutionally competent," forum for impartial resolution of claims against the military in which
societal norms are to be vindicated.
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Yet for the purposes of tort analysis, those are differences in degree and
not in kind. In other forms of socially necessary work, both in government
and the private sector, agents and third parties are routinely put in high-
risk situations, and compensation schemes are implemented in anticipation
of casualties.2
The soldier's relationship to the military organization is not of so spe-
cial a character that no tort liability arises from it. Rather, the military
relies on a no-fault compensation scheme for injuries incurred by soldiers
in the course of their military duties.
28 This scheme represents a recogni-
tion that military activity is routinely hazardous but at the same time so-
cially necessary.29 No-fault recovery that compensates according to a fixed
schedule based on degree of (rather than circumstances surrounding) in-
jury holds down transaction costs by obviating the need for extensive fault
inquiry30 and makes recoveries regular. This system thus rationalizes the
costs of accidental harms within the military; it should not be taken to
imply an absolute license of military commanders to inflict harm on mili-
tary personnel. Unless we are prepared to concede that the military's au-
thority to order soldiers into combat implies a power of life and death over
military personnel in all situations, then we must recognize-as even mili-
tary law does-that there are normative limits to the circumstances under
which the military may inflict injuries on its personnel. The question then
becomes which institution should determine what those limits are.
27. See, e.g. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act § 5, 33 U.S.C. § 905(a)
(1982) (providing for exclusivity of compensation); Federal Employees Compensation Act § 1(56), 5
U.S.C. § 8116 (1982) (exclusivity provision). See also Friedman & Ladinsky, Social Change and the
Law of Industrial Accidents, 67 COLUm. L. REv. 50, 71 (1967) ("rational, actuarial" workmen's
compensation scheme, with limited recovery, replaced unpredictable fault or negligence system).
In law enforcement, firefighting, and coal mining, for example, a high degree of occupational risk
seems to go along with a special need for esprit de corps and discipline among co-workers. See M.
WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 169-70 (1983) (discussing this phenomenon in coal mining).
28. The Veterans' Benefits Act, 38 U.S.C. §§ 314, 322, 334, 342 (1976), provides fixed rates of
compensation based on degree of injury; the rates are the same for wartime and peacetime injuries.
Active-duty members of the armed forces are eligible for free medical care. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1071-78.
29. Thus, in Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977), the
Court found that the purpose of the Veterans' Benefits Act was to provide "swift, efficient" compensa-
tion and to place an upper limit on government liability. The Supreme Court has hinted in dicta that
it would regard the Veterans' Benefits Act as an exclusive remedy, like other workmen's compensation
schemes. See Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U.S. 460, 464 (1980) (per curiam) (inter-
preting Stencel as finding veterans' benefits to be exclusive remedy for injured service members).
Presumably, such a holding would require the Court to overrule the Brooks and Brown exceptions to
the Feres doctrine, see supra note 9, and the Court seems to have backed away from this view. See
Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 460 U.S. 190, 197 n.8 (1983) (In Stencel, "we held that the
[Fetes] doctrine . . . precluded the substantive claim without regard to any exclusive-liability
provision.").
30. Veterans' benefit claims are often resolved on the basis of written claim forms submitted to
local review boards. A claimant, upon request, can be provided an informal, ex parte hearing that
inquires primarily into 1) the extent of injury and 2) whether the injury is service-connected. See
Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 105 S. Ct. 3180, 3183 (1985); 38 C.F.R. §§
3.103(a), (c) (1985).
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C. Inadequacies in the Intramilitary Remedial System
The military establishment contains a remedial system that compensates
its personnel for service-connected injuries 1 and deters wrongful conduct
by providing for punishments32 and a grievance procedure. 3  Thus, in
principle, the citizen tort-victim's right to initiate a judicial remedial pro-
cess is to some extent replicated for soldier tort-victims by intramilitary
remedies.
In practice, however, institutional pressures cause the military remedial
system to break down in precisely the cases where deterrence and compen-
sation are most needed. As instruments of military policy, the remedial
system cannot be relied upon to play a watchdog role, where that may
cause embarrassment to the military; instead, the remedial system may be
more likely to cover up military wrongdoing.3 4
31. See supra note 28.
32. The Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ"), 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1982) establishes
the following court-martial offenses: Art. 93 ("cruelty toward, or oppression or maltreatment of, any
person subject to [one's] orders"); Art. 97 (unlawful detention); Art. 118 (murder); Art. 128 (assault).
10 U.S.C. §§ 893, 897, 918, 928 (1982).
33. UCMJ Art. 138, 10 U.S.C. § 938 (1982) provides:
Any member of the armed forces who believes himself wronged by his commanding officer,
and who, upon due application to that commanding officer, is refused redress, may complain to
any superior commissioned officer, who shall forward the complaint to the officer exercising
general court-martial jurisdiction over the officer against whom it is made. The officer exercis-
ing general court-martial jurisdiction shall examine into the complaint and take proper mea-
sures for redressing the wrong complained of; and he shall, as soon as possible, send to the
Secretary concerned a true statement of that complaint, with the proceedings had thereon.
The Chappell court identified Art. 138 as the soldier's chief remedy against official abuse. See 462
U.S. at 302-03.
34. TheJaffee situation, see supra note 16, shows all too dearly how even the seemingly non-
controversial issue of compensation can become an instrument of military policy. To this day, the
military establishment has refused to acknowledge that it did anything to harm the Atomic Veterans.
See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1981, at 15, col. I (Reagan administration opposed Senate bill to give
priority to Atomic Veterans' claims before VA, on grounds that it creates "the mistaken impression"
that "exposure to low-level ionizing radiation is a significant health hazard"). Compare Veterans
Exposure Hearing, supra note 16, at 29-30 (statement of Lt. Gen. Harry A. Griffith, Director,
Defense Nuclear Agency) ("no credible data showing a correlation between exposure to extremely low
levels of radiation, such as that experienced by the veterans, and any adverse long term health ef-
fects") with Favish, supra note 16, at 949-51 (Army records systematically underestimated radiation
exposure by failing to take readings from all participants, failing to measure three of four forms of
radiation, and failing to monitor radiation inhaled or ingested). See also Review of the Dept. of En-
ergy's Health and Mortality Study: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of
the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 150 (1982) (statement of Robert
Alvarez, Washington Rep., Environmental Policy Center) (control by Deptartment of Energy of more
than 60% of all federal research on radiation health effects is "fundamental conflict of interest [that]
has created a record of suppression and distortion of science").
From the 1950s to the present, the military's response to the Atomic Veterans has been to cover up
rather than to remedy their problems. Despite official assurances at the time that radiation doses were
too low to cause harm, the documentary record shows a legacy of accidents, suppressed warnings and
unfavorable scientific studies, and manipulation of radiation readings taken from test sites and from
individual troops. See H. BALL, JuSTIcE DOWNWIND: AMEmCA'S ATOMIC TESTING PROGRAM IN
THE 1950s 198 (1986). For many of the 250,000 servicemen who participated, official records, includ-
ing radiation readings taken from the men at the time, were destroyed by fire at a federal records
center in St. Louis. See T. SAFFF.R & 0. KELLY, supra note 16, at 145; Favish, supra note 16, at
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The military justice system is probably competent to punish and deter
isolated misconduct of lower level officers 35 that sharply departs from the
military's own norms of behavior.3 6 But it may be less competent to deter
conduct that is part of a widespread problem. For example, racial and
sexual harrassment-widespread problems in the military no less than in
civilian society-have given rise to lawsuits in which the plaintiffs have
alleged that effective intramilitary redress was unavailable.
37 Nor do mili-
956-57. See also Veterans Exposure Hearings, supra note 16, at 19 (radiation dose data for at least
38% of 250,000 test participants must be "reconstructed"). This and other documentation, which the
Departments of Energy (successor to the AEC) and Defense have been resistant to delivering to indi-
vidual servicemen and Atomic Veterans' groups, is required by the Veterans Administration to prove
eligibility for disability benefits.
The VA's grudging attitude toward granting disability benefits has been consistent with the govern-
ment's implicit denial of liability. In VA claims, "reasonable doubt" regarding the service origin of
injury and degree of disability is to be resolved in the claimant's favor, but the claimant has the
burden "to submit evidence sufficient to justify a belief . . . that his claim is well-grounded." 
38
C.F.R. § 3.102 (1985). This evidentiary burden has been extremely difficult for radiation-exposure
claimants, due to the inaccurate radiation measurements made at the time and the subsequent loss 
of
records. Regulations promulgated by the VA director in late 1983 require the VA to concede a claim-
ant's participation in nuclear tests and a certain level of radiation exposure reconstructed from Army
records, where a claimant's records cannot be found by the VA. 38 C.F.R. § 3.311 (1985). Neverthe-
less, the VA still retains a good deal of discretion to find that a claimant's radiation-induced 
injuries
are not service-related. Legislative efforts to require the VA to presume service origin of all cancer
cases among Atomic Veterans have proved unavailing. See infra note 71. Atomic Veterans have suf-
fered from a broad range of illnesses, in disproportionate numbers for their age cohorts, but the VA
refuses to recognize non-cancerous diseases as being linked to radiation exposure, despite new medical
knowledge to the contrary. See Veterans Exposure Hearings, supra note 16, at 290, 293, 303 (state-
ment of John Smitherman, Pres., Nat. Ass'n of Atomic Veterans). Only 15 out of 3,050 veterans
claiming injuries from atomic-testing radiation exposure have received compensation. See Table dated
Sep. 3, 1985, furnished by Alvin M. Guttman, Legislative Counsel, Nat. Ass'n of Atomic Veterans
(on file with the author). For an account of one veteran's eventually successful six-year struggle for
VA compensation, see T. SAFFER & 0. KELLY, supra note 16, at 149-200.
Many ex-servicemen are probably deterred by the time and expense of gathering expert medical
opinions to present to VA hearing boards; moreover, the VA is authorized to pay, and attorneys are
allowed to accept, only ten dollars in attorneys' fees of a successful claimant. 38 U.S.C. §§ 3404-05
(1982); see Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 105 S. Ct. 3180 (1985).
35. The lower the rank of the offending individual, the greater the number of superiors there are
who may impose summary non-judicial punishments under UCMJ Art. 15, 10 U.S.C. 815 (1982).
See AIR FORCE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL SCHOOL, MILITARY JUSTICE DESKBOOK 93-97 (1984)
(describing authority of officers of various ranks to impose summary punishment). In addition, lower
ranking personnel tend to have fewer resources with which to defend themselves against disciplinary
action, including peer sympathy of the officers sitting on courts-martial and influence within the hier-
archy. High-ranking officers can sometimes exert control over investigations into their own miscon-
duct. See For Admiral, Warning;for G.L's, Jail, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1985, § 1, at 5, col.3 (lower-
ranking servicemen court-martialed and imprisoned "at hard labor" for smuggling captured enemy
weapons from Grenada to U.S., but admiral given nonpunitive warning for same offense after head-
ing off investigation).
36. The military's zeal to deter conduct deviating from its own norms has never been in doubt.
Indeed, the UCMJ was an attempt to "civilianize" military justice and lessen the ferocity with which
such deviations were punished. Sherman, The Civilianization of Military Law, 22 ME. L. REv. 3,
15-29, 59 (1970). Despite the "civilianization," the UCMJ includes offenses that are based on disloy-
alty or non-conformity to exclusively military norms.. See Art. 88 (uttering contemptuous words
against government officials), Art. 89 (disrespect to superior officer), Art. 133 (conduct unbecoming an
officer), Art. 134 (conduct "to the prejudice of good order and discipline" or of such a nature as to
bring discredit upon the armed forces), 10 U.S.C. §§ 888, 889, 933, 934 (1982).
37. See Brown v. United States, 739 F.2d 362 (8th Cir. 1984) (no disciplinary action taken
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tary remedies seem equipped to deal with more isolated instances of con-
duct that egregiously violates civilian but not military norms, such as use
of troops for experimentation,"8 or the suppression of dissenting views.39
In general, the effectiveness of intramilitary remedies in deterring military
misconduct is limited by the fact that the military does not view its justice
against racially motivated "mock lynching" of black national guard trainee by fellow guardsmen);
Stubbs v. United States, 744 F.2d 58, 61 (8th Cir. 1984) (female soldier, who committed suicide after
being sexually assaulted by her drill sergeant, believed that superior officers would not respond to her
grievance but would brand her a troublemaker); Brief for Respondents at 2-3, Chappell v. Wallace,
462 U.S. 296 (1983) (ship's captain and junior officers, who allegedly prevented black sailors' place-
ment in skilled work positions and gave out punishments and low performance ratings on racial
grounds, also allegedly failed to identify and discipline sailors who put KKK graffiti and noose in
black sailor's work space). See also United States v. Huilum, 15 M.J. 261, 264-65 (C.M.A. 1983)
(black sailor, who absented himself after receiving death threats from shipmates and unsuccessfully
seeking help from superior officers, had arguable duress defense to court-martial charges of unautho-
rized absence); United States v. Roberts and Sutek, 14 M.J. 671, 673 (N.M.C.M.R. 1982) (court-
martial charges of unauthorized absence against female sailor dismissed on defense of duress because
sailor had been subjected to physical and verbal sexual harrassment, reasonably feared serious bodily
injury from shipmates, and had unsuccessfully complained to superior officers).
Race relations in the armed forces have improved somewhat since reaching a crisis point during the
Vietnam war, when dozens of incidents of race-related violence took place on military bases and ships
at sea. See Brief for Respondents at 32-35, Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983). At Camp
Lejeune, North Carolina, a Marine Corps basic training camp, 160 assaults, muggings and robberies
with racial overtones took place in the first seven months of 1969. D. ZILLMAN, A. BLAUSTEIN, E.
SHERMAN, D. FAW, M. LARKIN, J. MUNSTER, J. PAUST, R. PECKHAM & A. RAKAS, THE MILI-
TARY IN AMERICAN SOCIETY § 4.09 at 4-95 (1977) [hereinafter cited as D. ZILLMAN, A. BLAUSTEIN,
E. SHERMAN]. Responding to this outbreak, the Marine Corps appointed an investigating committee,
which reported: "In the opinion of the black marine, he has no official channel available to him by
and through which he can obtain redress for complaints of discrimination." N.Y. Times, Aug. 10,
1969, p. 67, col. 5. In 1973, the Army and Air Force established "Race Relations Councils" and
"Equal Opportunity Staff Officers" for the airing of grievances. But "with the air of crisis gone, the
effectiveness of the race relations efforts depends considerably upon the interest and tolerance of the
commander." D. ZILLMAN, A. BLAUSTEIN, E. SHERMAN, supra, § 4.09 at 4-100-4-101. Gender
relations, too, are left largely to the discretion of the commander. See, e.g., United States v. Moorer,
15 M.J. 520, 522-23 (noting base commander's policy prohibiting "use of rank or supervisory posi-
tion to intimidate or take advantage of soldier in a training status for personal sexual gratification
regardless of the knowledge or consent of the individual involved").
38. For example, ordering troops into training exercises to test the effects of nudear weapons on
soldiers' combat performance, see supra note 16, or using unwitting volunteers to test the effects of
LSD, see Stanley v. United States, 574 F. Supp. 474 (S.D. Fla. 1983); Bishop v. United States, 574
F. Supp. 66 (D.D.C. 1983), may not appear different, from a military point of view, from any other
dangerous training exercise, such as "live fire" training, or testing of new equipment. But under
civilian standards of informed consent, the radiation and LSD tests are involuntary human experi-
mentation, not unlike the actions which the Nuremberg Trials held to give rise to criminal liability
despite defenses of military necessity and obedience to superior orders. See United States v. Brandt, in
2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 1-12, 174-84
(1947).
39. In particular, service members' adherence to the norms of open public debate is sometimes
taken by insiders as disloyalty to the military and punished by lawless reprisals. See, e.g., Sigler v.
LeVan, 485 F. Supp. 185 (D.Md. 1980) (Army counterintelligence agent planning to write memoirs
found dead in motel room after Army intelligence, CIA and FBI agents allegedly interrogated him
there for nine days and extorted his papers and effects from his wife); Mollnow v. Carlton, 716 F.2d
627 (9th Cir. 1983) (Air Force officer, whose repeated warnings about unsafe operation of jet aircraft
were ignored by superiors, alleged that his superiors, embarrassed when jet plane did crash, sup-
pressed his reports and grievances and conspired to drive him out of Air Force). Cf. Nixon v. Fitzger-
ald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (Air Force civilian
"whistleblower" allegedly removed from job illegally by White House aides for "disloyalty").
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system or grievance procedure as a way of deterring misconduct defined
by civilian norms.4
The Feres doctrine's failure to distinguish between negligent and inten-
tional or constitutional torts has allowed courts applying the doctrine to
gloss over the possible inadequacies of intramilitary remedies. Torts that
are "merely" negligent may often involve more serious physical injuries
40. Court-martial practice bears this out to some extent. In "civilianizing" military justice, Con-
gress has always shown great concern for the problem of "command influence": an officer's abuse 
of
authority to influence a court-martial proceeding. See H. MOYER, JUSTICE AND THE MILITARY § 3-
100, at 677-78 (1972) (defining "command influence); id. § 3-111, at 684-85 (recounting congres-
sional debate on command influence from 1950 to 1970s). Command influence symoblizes a confron-
tation of military preferences for hierarchical control and summary discipline with a civilian 
concep-
tion of "due process." Although command influence remains a pervasive problem, the military has not
sought to deter it by using the established sanction of Article 98, 10 U.S.C. § 898 (1982) (failure 
to
adhere to other UCMJ provisions, or to interfere with court-martial process is itself a court-martial
offense). Since the UCMJ's inception in 1950, there has not been a single prosecution for unlawful
comand influence. Telephone interview with Robert S. Rivkin, court-martial defense attorney (March
13, 1986). See H. MOYER, supra, § 3-340, at 776 (Art. 98 "is a dead letter"). Instead, command
influence is treated as a procedural defect, raised on behalf of court-martial defendants. See, e.g.,
United States v. Berry, 39 C.M.R. 541 (1968).
This pattern of implementing the ban on command influence suggests a split between the com-
mand-level practice, on the one hand, and the principle imposed by military appellate judges 
and
policy-makers on the other. The racial and sexual harrassment cases that filter up to the military and
civilian appellate courts suggest a similar pattern. An aggrieved service member unsuccessfully seeks
redress from his or her commander and then engages in an act of self-help, such as unauthorized
absence. As a result, court-martial charges are brought; and it is only at the level of military appellate
courts that the initial unremedied grievance is recognized. See United States v. Hullum, 15 M.J. 261,
264-65 (1983) (black sailor, who absented himself after receiving death threats from shipmates and
unsuccessfully seeking help from superior officers, had arguable duress defense to court-martial
charges of unauthorized absence); United States v. Roberts and Sutek, 14 M.J. 671, 673 (1982)
(court-martial charges of unauthorized absence against female sailor dismissed on defense of duress
because sailor had been subjected to physical and verbal sexual harrassment, and reasonably feared
serious bodily harm from shipmates, and had unsuccessfully complained to superior officers). This
pattern suggests, as in the command influence example, that while high-ranking military officials 
and
judges are more than willing to set policies and precedents favorable to the integration of women 
and
minorities, command level officers nevertheless have a great deal of discretion under such regulations.
These latter officers may be less committed to resolving race and gender problems, yet they, for the
most part, control the grievance procedure. See generally R. RIVKIN & B. STICHMAN, THE RIGHITS
OF MILITARY PERSONNEL 129 (1977) (commanding officers tend to ignore regulations on 
racial
discrimination).
Finally, the service person's grievance procedure is a highly implausible vehicle for pressing a con-
troversial grievance. Article 138 grievances are passed up through the chain of command, with no time
limit or sanction for delay; any of the officers passing on the complaint may stall with relative impu-
nity. See Dep't of the Army Regulation AR 27-14 (1979); H. MOYER, supra § 6-234, at 1207-08.
Moreover, the soldier's exercise of the right to complain can sometimes lead to adverse disciplinary
action. See, e.g., United States v. Wolfson, 36 C.M.R. 722 (1966); United States v. Schmidt, 
16
C.M.A. 57, 36 C.M.R. 213 (1966). In Wolfson, a drafted doctor serving in Vietnam was charged and
convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman when, after a period of frequent complaints
about his duty assignment to Vietnam and the unavailability of surgical supplies, he finally presented
his grievance in person to the Vietnam Commander, General William Westmoreland. A divided court
of Military review noted that the complaints were "emotional and immature. . . ill advised. . . ill-
timed, indiscreet and impolitic" but reversed the conviction nevertheless. In Schmidt, an enlisted man
who had threatened to send the story of his grievance to a local newspaper, was charged with and
convicted of extortion and wrongful communication of threat; but the military appellate court over-
turned the conviction. These cases suggest, again, that military appellate principles may differ from
those of command level officers.
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than torts that can be characterized as intentional or constitutional. But
negligent torts are distinguished by the absence of norm-violating behav-
ior, and the military's interest in efficiently performing its function creates
incentives to discipline negligent conduct-from the careless maintenance
personnel responsible for a barracks fire to the foolhardy officer who or-
ders his troops into an untenable combat situation-through internal
channels.4" Intentional or constitutional torts offend societal norms in a
way that deserves moral condemnation, and an action for damages is a
way to vindicate these norms, as well as to compensate the victim. 42 The
military justice system can be expected to fulfill this function by imposing
administrative or criminal sanctions only where its norms and interests
accord with civilian ones.
II. INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE OF CIVILIAN REMEDIES
The judiciary's long-standing deference to the military's requirements
for discipline reflects a lack of faith in its own institutional competence:
Courts consider themselves unable to evaluate what military discipline re-
quires, and in particular, what adverse impact various judicial "intru-
sions" might have.43 But this concern for discipline does not demand the
Feres doctrine's complete abdication, in the intramilitary context, of the
judiciary's proper role in remedying torts of government officials.
A. Judicial Intrusion into Military Discipline
Courts have justified the Feres doctrine as necessary to avoid the intru-
sion into military discipline caused by a full civilian adjudication of in-
tramilitary tort claims. What courts have meant by "discipline" is really a
combination of three different concerns. 4 '
41. See, e.g., UCMJ Art. 109, 10 U.S.C. § 909 (punishing negligent damage to military
property).
42. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) ("In situations of abuse of office, an
action for damages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guarantees.");
Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Alienability. One View of the Cathedral,
85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1126 & n.71 (1972) (punitive damages analogized to criminal sanctions).
43. See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. at 300-02; United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112
(1954).
44. Courts have also expressed anxiety over the potentially great volume of intramilitary tortlitigation. Even without the Feres doctrine, however, courts could dispose of frivolous suits on sum-
mary judgment. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507-09 (1978). Moreover, the alarm about"floods of litigation" in the tort setting reflects an extremely narrow view: The potential volume of
tort litigation often reflects an underlying social problem in need of redress, particularly where plain-
tiffs persist in bringing suits in the face of procedural obstacles. See Zacharias, The Politics of Torts,95 YALE L.J. 698, 726 (1986). Even where a legislative solution may, in the long run, be moreefficient or "institutionally competent," the removal by courts of a judge-made immunity rule may
still be necessary to prod legislators into action. See id. at 728-29; infra note 71.
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1. Causing Disruption through Factual Inquiries
Military officials would no doubt prefer that their decisions and actions
be completely shielded from civilian review."
5 Such civilian review can
cause embarrassment to the military, and harm its prestige;
46 it can bring
to light, heighten or even create dissension within the ranks; and these
consequences can chill vigorous decisionmaking.
47 The prospect of "second
guessing military orders, and [requiring] members of the Armed Forces to
testify as to one anothers' decisions and actions"
48 can thus threaten the
military's reputation and internal loyalty and unity.
But these interests in themselves provide a dubious basis for barring
civilian factual inquiries, because there is a recognized public interest in
having a military establishment that is not entirely closed, monolithic and
secretive.' 9 Moreover, these interests have not been deemed strong enough
45. "Civilian" review should be taken to refer to oversight by the legislative and judicial branches
of government and the general public. Civilian officials of defense agencies within the 
executive
branch are better thought of as members of the military organization for the purposes 
of this Note
because institutional pressures within the military establishment have tended to "militarize" 
civilian
officials, who cannot be relied upon to impose democratic checks on the military's influence 
over
public policy. A. YARMOLINSKY, THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT 83-84 (1971); Pilisuk & Hayden,
Is There a Military-Industrial Complex which Prevents Peace? in THE BIAS OF PLURALISM 123 
(W.
Connolly ed. 1969).
46. The related problem of risk to security can be alleviated by judicious use 
of privileges, in
camera inspections and the like. See Sigler v. LeVan, 485 F. Supp. 185, 198-99 (D.Md. 
1980) (re-
jecting defendant's argument that litigation would compromise national security).
47. See infra text accompanying notes 53-57. The chilling effect of potential embarrassment
through civilian factual inquiries should not be overemphasized, however. First, it is 
far from clear
that disclosures at a civilian tribunal can bring greater dishonor upon a military officer 
than disclo-
sures at a military tribunal, since a military officer may well place greater value on 
the judgment of
his military peers than on that of a civilian judge and jury. Second, intramilitary inquiries 
and courts-
martial are not necessarily shielded from civilian scrutiny anyway. Soldiers may be 
represented at
court-martial proceedings by civilian lawyers. United States v. Jorge, 23 C.M.A. 580, 50 
C.M.R. 845
(1975); United States v. Donohew, 18 C.M.A. 149, 39 C.M.R. 149 (1969). Court-martial 
proceed-
ings must be open to the public, unless classified information would be disclosed. COMMITrEE 
FOR
LEGAL RESEARCH ON THE DRAFT, BASIC RESOURCE MATERIALS ON MILITARY LAW 
55 (3rd ed.
1971). During the court-martial of Army doctor Howard Levy during the Vietnam War, 
the defen-
dant's civilian lawyer made frequent recourse to the local and national press. See R. SHERRILL, 
MILI-
TARY JUSTICE IS TO JUSTICE AS MILITARY Music is TO Music 148 (1970). Still, military 
authori-
ties can often, in practice, exercise control over investigations or court-martial proceedings 
to limit the
potential for embarrassment.
48. Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977).
49. Cf New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., 
concurring)
(duty of press to "expose deception in government" in order to "prevent any part 
of the government
from deceiving the people and sending them off to distant lands to die of foreign fevers 
and foreign
shot and shell"). Investigations into military or other executive affairs by Congress 
or the press are
vital to the political process. Also, rivalry within and between branches of the 
military has been
valued for enhancing civilian control, in part by providing competing sources of information 
that
generate alternatives for civilian policymakers. See A. KANTER, DEFENSE POLIrICS 
24 (1975); see
also A. YARMOLINSKY & G. FOSTER, PARADOXES OF POWER: THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT 
IN
THE EIGHTIES 97 (1983) (Joint Chiefs of Staff purposely set up so as to protect autonomy 
of military
branches from centralized control, and chiefs encouraged to report individually to Congress). 
Occa-
sional embarrassment to the military in the arena of politics can be justified as necessary 
to the ability
of Congress to fulfill its constitutional role of military policymaking. Although the 
judiciary is not




to foreclose haling military officers into court when the plaintiff was other
than an intramilitary tort victim. 50 Civilian plaintiffs are not barred from
bringing suit for injuries caused by the tortious conduct of the military, 1
even though servicemen injured in the same incident would be barred
from suing under Feres.52 In cases involving civilian plaintiffs, the extent
of factual inquiries into military affairs does not appear to be substantially
less than in cases involving military plaintiffs.
2. Chilling Decisionmaking by Damage Remedies
Vigorous decisionmaking and execution of military activities represents
an important societal interest that can conflict with the interest in deter-
ring overzealous conduct by military officers. The prospect of intramili-
tary damage remedies could chill vigorous decisionmaking at all levels of
command. However, the public interest in protecting decisionmaking
processes varies with the type of decision or function involved. For exam-
ple, a strategic or tactical decision during wartime may be entitled to the
utmost protection from judicial intrusion,53 whereas a decision to test the
of an executive agency in avoiding embarrassment justifies immunity from investigation in a judicial
proceeding. Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706-13 (1974) (generalized claim of executive
privilege outweighed by interests of compulsory criminal process).
50. General William Westmoreland's multi-million dollar defamation suit against CBS brought
high-ranking military officials into court to testify on both sides as to decisions and actions that were
highly sensitive, from the point of view of prestige, if not security. See, e.g., Jury Told of Order to Cut
Troop Count, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1985 at B6, col. 4; CBS Witness Says General Set Ceiling, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 6, 1985, at B4, col. 1; 2 Veterans Testify on Enemy for CBS, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1985,
at B3, col. 4. Indeed, Westmoreland claimed to have settled the case because he was disheartened that
a colleague, Maj. Gen. Joseph McChristian, had testified against him. The Westmoreland Case: A
Broken West Point Tie, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1985, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
51. The language of the FTCA makes explicit that Congress contemplated suits against the mili-
tary, leaving exceptions to liability for claims "arising out of the combatant activities of the military
* during time of war." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (1982); see Feres, 340 U.S. at 138.
52. In Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247 (D.Utah 1984), the court tried the claims of
twenty-four civilian "down wind" residents for injuries due to their exposure to radioactive fallout
from the nuclear tests involved in Jaffee. Ten of the twenty-four plaintiffs won damage awards
against the government, totaling $2.4 million, and over a thousand claims are still pending. Allen, 588
F. Supp. at 448. The scope of the litigation is comparable to that presented by the class of servicemen
in Jaffee. See also Stencel Aero Engineering Corp v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 676-77 (1977)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing hypothetical cases in which civilians injured in same factual
transaction as military personnel might recover); In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation,
580 F. Supp. 1242 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (same). But see, e.g., Hinkie v. United States, 715 F.2d 96, 98
(3d Cir. 1983) (barring Atomic Veterans' children's claims on grounds that "genesis" of children's
injury was genetic damage to fathers whose claims were barred by Feres); Lombard v. United States,
690 F.2d 215, 227 (D.C.Cir. 1982) (same); Monaco v. United States, 661 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989 (1982) (same). The reasoning of these cases has been attacked in In re
"Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 580 F. Supp. 1242. In that part of the massive "Agent
Orange" litigation, wives of servicemen exposed to Agent Orange claimed that genetic damage to their
husbands' sperm from exposure to the chemical caused them to miscarry because they had conceived
defective fetuses. The court held that their claims were not barred under the Feres doctrine's protec-
tion of defense contractors.
53. See, for example, FTCA exceptions to government liability for "discretionary functions" or
"combatant activities," 28 U.S.C. §§ 2680(a) & 0).
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usefulness of LSD for interrogations 54  or to suppress reports of
whistleblowers55 deserves less protection. But the Feres doctrine indis-
criminantly accords the same absolute protection to combat decisions as it
does to the decision to commit a sexual assault. 6 The breadth of claims
barred by Feres suggests the need for a particularized inquiry into the
military function, or the type of decision, that would be protected. Courts
typically undertake such inquiries-weighing the defendant's interest in
protecting its decisionmaking-later in the litigation, when considering
the defendant's claim for immunity.5
3. Promoting Disobedience of Soldiers
Courts applying the Feres doctrine have expressed the fear that hearing
intramilitary tort claims on the merits would interfere with the special
authority relations between military personnel and their superiors, under-
mining a soldier's habit of obedience to commands.
58 This proposition im-
plies that lower-ranking personnel would become more likely to challenge
or defy orders if they believed they could assert rights that would be en-
forceable in civilian courts or initiate proceedings that would place their
superiors temporarily under civilian control.59
Generally speaking, it is true almost by definition that consciousness of
one's rights makes any person less inclined to obey authority. But the
military does not have a legitimate or recognized interest in the blind obe-
dience of its personnel.80 In addition to providing the grievance procedure,
military law tries to allow some rights to military personnel, including
constitutional rights. 1 Moreover, military law imposes an obligation on
54. See, e.g., Stanley v. United States, 574 F. Supp. 474 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
55. See Mollnow v. Carlton, 716 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1983) (whistleblower's claim barred).
56. See Stubbs v. United States, 744 F.2d 58 (11th Cir. 1984).
57. See infra note 97.
58. See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. at 300. But cf Dep't of the Army Regulation AR 600-20
("Authority will impose its weight by the professional competence of leaders at all echelons rather
than by the arbitrary or despotic methods of martinets. . ."), quoted in R. Riviur & B. STICHMAN,
supra note 40, at 123.
59. This effect on discipline is an empirical question. Conceivably, damage remedies could be
available and invoked from time to time without promoting defiance in the ranks. The existence of
such damage remedies might actually promote discipline because soldiers could be more confident that
obeying orders would not result in undetected harms to them, such as irradiation or ingestion of LSD.
60. Compare Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. at 300 (dictum) ("habit of immediate compliance
with military procedures and orders must be virtually reflex with no time for debate or reflection")
with United States v. Calley, 22 C.M.A. 534, 541, 48 C.M.R. 19, 26 (1973) ("[Tlhe obedience of a
soldier is not the obedience of an automaton. A soldier is a reasoning agent, obliged to respond, not as
a machine, but as a person.").
61. See, e.g., Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 142 (1953) (federal courts have habeas corpus juris-
diction to review all constitutional issues not fully and fairly considered by military tribunals); United
States v. Tempia, 16 C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967) (protections in Bill of Rights available to
court-martial defendants); United States v. Lange, 14 C.M.A. 486, 35 C.M.R. 458 (1965) (Fourth
Amendment prohibits dragnet "shakedown searches" for contraband in private rooms and lockers).
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soldiers to refuse to obey unlawful orders, a duty quite inconsistent with
unthinking obedience even to combat commands.82 Finally, the military's
interest in such strict discipline cannot be the value of discipline for its
own sake, or even for the sake of performing the military's wide range of
non-combat functions; its interest ultimately lies in the connection between
disicpline and combat readiness and effectiveness. Yet combat effective-
ness, as a practical matter, is not necessarily correlated with blind obedi-
ence to commands.83
Military law thus embodies policies that suggest that the need for obe-
dience does not preclude significant rights and remedies against superiors.
Federal courts seem implicitly to recognize this principle in their willing-
ness to adjudicate claims of rights outside the tort context." Such claims,
of course, differ substantially in certain respects from tort claims in that
they can be resolved without intrusive factual inquiries and decision-
chilling remedies.6 5 However, the prospect of non-tort claims can swell a
Fifth amendment rights are embodied in UCMJ Articles 31 (freedom from self-incrimination) and
139 (redress for unlawful taking of or damage to property), 10 U.S.C. §§ 831, 939.
62. Soldiers are subject to criminal sanctions for obeying orders to commit war crimes. See United
States v. Calley, 22 C.M.A. 534, 541-44, 48 C.M.R. 19, 26-29 (1973) (obedience to superior orders
no defense where defendant should have known that order to kill civilians was illegal); United States
v. Kinder, 14 C.M.R. 742, 770-73 (1953) (soldier who executed order to shoot subdued prisoner at
South Korean airbase could not rely on obedience to superior orders as defense).
63. During World War II, the War Department dispatched Historical Teams to stay close to the
front lines and conduct interviews with troops shortly after combat. The data from the thousands of
interviews provided the basis for several studies concluding that troops in combat are motivated to
fight, rather than break and run, by the near presence of comrades and a desire not to let those
comrades down. See S. MARSHALL, MEN AGAINST FIRE 40-41 (1947); R. RivKIN, GI RIGHTS AND
ARMY JUSTICE 336-37 (1970); J. KEEGAN, THE FACE OF BATTLE 72-73 (1976). The norms of
hierarchy, leadership, discipline, or fear of court-martial did not figure as important motivators. See
R. RIVKIN, supra; Howland, The Hands-Off Polity and Intramilitaiy Torts, 71 IowA L. REv. 93,
115-18 (1985).
64. Since the 1950s, military personnel have obtained judicial review of court-martial proceedings
(through federal habeas corpus jurisdiction), less-than-honorable discharges, refusals to discharge con-
scientious objectors, and treatment violating either military statutes or regulations, or claimed constitu-
tional rights. See generally Sherman, Legal Inadequacies and Doctrinal Restraints in Controlling
the Military, 49 IND. L.J. 539, 560-81 (1974). In addition, the Court of Claims has jurisdiction over
claims involving interference with military career advantage, and it may award "liquidated or unli-
quidated damages in cases not sounding 'in tort.'"' 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2) (1982).
65. Non-tort intramilitary claims in civilian courts tend to involve procedural challenges from
administrative or court-martial rulings where the federal court takes the facts as given from the mili-
tary tribunal, compare Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 736 (1974) ("The facts upon which [Levy's]
conviction rests are virtually undisputed . . . . Appellee persisted in his refusal to obey the order
. . .") with R. SHERRILL, supra note 47, at 98-157 (court-martial authority did not allow defendant
Levy to raise defense of unlawfulness of orders, so that military could cover up defendant's allegations
of war crimes by U.S. special forces in Vietnam); or else purely legal challenges to military statutes or
regulations, see, e.g., Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (First Amendment and statutory chal-
lenge to military regulation requiring base commanders' approval before solicitation of signatures for
petitions); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (sex discrimination challenge to statutory pro-
motion and discharge policies); Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir 1984) (equal protec-
tion challenge to military statute proscribing homosexual conduct); Goldman v. Secretary of Defense,
734 F.2d 1531 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (free exercise clause challenge to application of Air Force regulation
prohibiting wearing of yarmulke). For general discussions of such legal challenges, see Sherman,
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soldier's sense of his or her rights as much as, if not more than, tort
claims.6" Yet courts have never held that military personnel are barred
from all redress in civilian courts for wrongs suffered in the military.67
B. Judicial Competence-by Default
In taking the position that federal courts have no role in adjudicating
intramilitary tort claims, the Feres decisions have relied heavily on the
competence of intramilitary remedies. Indeed, the Court in Chappell im-
plied that because Congress has "plenary constitutional authority over the
military," congressional creation of intramilitary remedies precludes the
judiciary from reviewing any intramilitary damage claims.6" The implica-
tion that courts have no proper role in this field is misleading and incon-
sistent with the Supreme Court's fashioning of public tort law. 9
supra note 64; Note, Judicial Review of Constitutional Claims Against the Military, 84 COLUM.
L.REV. 387 (1984).
66. Arguably, the right to press tort claims is far more dangerous than the right to challenge
administrative matters, because the former might affect obedience to a combat command. But such an
objection is addressed by the proposal of this Note, which would not allow active-duty service mem-
bers to sue or alter the absolute immunity for officers in combat situations.
67. See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. at 304. However, federal courts have usually deferred to
the military in deriding the merits of these claims. See, e.g., Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1979)
(military's special need for discretion over internal discipline and morale justifies restrictions on First
Amendment rights that would be unacceptable in civilian setting); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733
(1974) (same). Several circuits, following Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971), have
adopted a restrictive justiciability standard that precludes review on the merits where the soldier-
plaintiff's interest is relatively weak and the military's interest relatively strong. See Note, supra note
65, at 397 n.57. The Supreme Court has not adopted the Mindes approach, however.
68. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. at 301-02. "Congress, the constitutionally authorized source of
authority over the military system of justice, has not provided a damage remedy for claims by military
personnel that constitutional rights have been violated by superior officers. Any action to provide a
judicial response by way of such a remedy would be plainly inconsistent with Congress' activity in this
field." Id. at 304.
69. Part of the confusion arises from the fact that there are two avenues for tort claims against the
government. The FTCA is a congressional act that provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity.
Prior to the statute's enactment in 1946, tort claims naming the United States as a party were barred
by sovereign immunity-a common law doctrine inherited from English common law-and tort reme-
dies against the United States were only available through private bill legislation by Congress. P.
ScHucK, supra note 25, at 37. Since the passage of the FTCA, a tort claim against the government is
based on a statutory cause of action. Thus, in defining the scope of federal government liability in tort,
the courts must construe a congressional statute. In interpreting the legislative intent behind the
FTCA, the Feres Court used the existing military compensation scheme, not to suggest that congres-
sional activity in the field of intramilitary injury law precluded judicial activity in that field, but
rather as evidence to support a particular interpretation of the FTCA: that Congress could not ration-
ally have intended to subject the federal government to various state-law standards of care and mea-
sures of recovery for injured soldiers when the military compensation scheme was designed to provide
uniform recovery.
The second avenue for tort claims against the government, a Bivens remedy, is a judicially-created,
federal common-law remedy, implied directly from the Constitution, and designed to fill a statutory
gap where Congress has failed to create adequate statutory remedies for violations of constitutional
rights. Congressional intent does enter into a Bivens analysis in that the existence of an alternative,
equally effective remedy deemed by Congress to be a substitute for recovery under the Constitution
would pre-empt a Bivens remedy. See supra note 20. Yet the degree of deference that courts owe to
congressional intent is arguably less than in construing a statute, because the court in a Bivens analy-
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Bivens and its progeny70 suggest a role for the courts in enforcing con-
stitutional norms to deter unconstitutional tortious conduct where Con-
gress has not created adequate remedial structures. The military system of
compensation and justice presents such a situation: As an institution, the
military is not competent to remedy certain instances of wrongful
conduct.
7 1
The purpose of deterrence by public tort remedies is to protect the
norms of a society governed by civilian law. Although civilian courts may
sis is often interpreting congressional inaction. The Bihens court itself actually appeared to have gone
against the implied will of Congress, since the remedy it created-damages for intentional torts com-
mitted by law enforcement officials-was at that time explicitly precluded under the FTCA. 28
U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1970) (amended, Pub. L. No. 95-253, 88 Stat. 50 (1974)). Indeed, the history of
public tort law in America has been a story of "extraordinary judicial creativity and chronic legislative
neglect." P. Sciiucx, supra note 25, at 53.
70. See supra note 20.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 31-42.
The case of the Atomic Veterans shows not only the inadequacy of military compensation, see
supra note 34, but also legislative neglect. After at least six years of hearings on the subject, Congress
has passed only two pieces of legislation aimed at relief of Atomic Veterans. (I do not count the
ceremonial proclamation of an "Atomic Veterans Day" in 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-54, 97 Stat. 288
(1983).) The first, Pub. L. No. 97-72, 95 Stat. 1047 (1981) (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 610(a),(e)
(1982)), provided that Atomic Veteran cancer victims could be treated at VA hospitals "notwithstand-
ing that there is insufficient medical evidence to conclude that such disability may be [service-
connected]." This act did not provide for compensation, however, and because the law still allowed the
VA to deny medical treatment of non-cancerous illnesses and cancers that the VA felt could affirma-
tively be identified as not service-related, the act "has proven totally inadequate in meeting the health
care needs of atomic veterans." Veterans Exposure Hearing, supra note 16, at 290 (statement of John
Smitherman, Pres., Nat. Ass'n of Atomic Veterans). The Veterans' Dioxin and Radiation Exposure
Compensation Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 98-542, 98 Stat. 2725 (1984), found that "there is scientific
and medical uncertainty regarding [the] long-term adverse health effects," id. at § 2, of ionizing radia-
tion (and "agent orange" exposure) and provided only that the Veterans Administrator "prescribe
regulations to. . . establish guidelines and (where appropriate) standards and criteria for the resolu-
tion of claims" by Atomic Veterans. Id. at § 5(a). Significantly, this act was a watered-down version
of the bill reported from the House Committee on Veterans Affairs. Entitled "Agent Orange and
Atomic Veterans Relief Act," H.R. 1961, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. (1984) (emphasis added), the bill would
have established a presumption of service-connection for all Atomic Veteran cancer cases diagnosed
within 20 years after the serviceman's participation in the tests. Current VA regulations provide that
diagnosis of chronic illnesses must occur within seven years of discharge from the armed forces, a rule
which has blocked many claimants. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.109 (1985). The defeated provisions of H.R.
1961 have been resubmitted as The Atomic Veterans Relief Act of 1985, H.R. 1613, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1985).
This legislative history is instructive on intramilitary tort victims' hopes of legislative reform in
general. The Atomic Veterans are the victims of a single course of tortious conduct, in which 250,000
were initially affected. They are now represented by two national organizations, the Nat. Ass'n of
Radiation Survivors, and the Nat. Ass'n of Atomic Veterans, and additional veterans' groups repre-
senting at least 1,300 "agent orange" victims have at times allied with them. Despite the size and
organization of this group, they have had extremely limited success in obtaining legislative redress for
compensation (the issue of vindication of their rights beyond compensation is not even considered). See
also N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1984, at A26, col. 1 (discussing passage of Warner Amendment to arms
appropriations bill, granting Feres-type immunity from Atomic Veteran suits to nuclear weapons
contractors). The Warner Amendment suggests that there is virtually no chance of legislative redress
for those affected by individual rather than mass torts. Their ineffectuality before the legislature
makes intramilitary tort victims prime candidates for judicial redress. A liberal liability rule in in-
tramilitary tort law could prompt a more satisfactory legislative response. Cf Zacharias, supra note
44, at 728-29 (discussing judicial prompting of legislative solutions to private-law torts).
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lack a certain competence, in the sense of knowledge about military disci-
pline, they are generally competent to weigh evidence on issues of great
technical complexity, and they are more competent than the military to
reach a substantively legitimate outcome in deciding when constitutional
rights have been violated . 2 The issue at the heart of the Feres doctrine is
this: In the absence of congressional guidance,73 who will balance the mil-
itary's discipline interest against civilian and constitutional norms-the
courts or the military ?7
III. A PROPOSAL FOR FEDERAL COURT ADJUDICATION OF
INTRAMILITARY TORT CLAIMS
The courts have, in effect, allowed the military to strike this balance.
The Feres doctrine presumes both the adequacy of intramilitary remedies
and the threat to discipline posed by lawsuits in all intramilitary tort
claims. Yet courts could instead fashion a less restrictive rule that takes
account of Feres concerns while allowing certain intramilitary claims to go
72. Cf. Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1953) ("Orderly government requires that the
judiciary be as scrupulous not to interfere with legitimate Army matters as the Army must be scrupu-
lous not to intervene in judicial matters.").
Chief Justice Warren noted the need for increased judicial oversight of the military despite lack of
knowledge: "I suppose it cannot be said that the courts of today are more knowledgeable about the
requirements of military discipline than the courts in the early days of the Republic. Nevertheless
• . . [w]hen the authority of the military has such a sweeping capacity for affecting the lives of our
citizenry, the wisdom of treating the military establishment as an enclave beyond the reach of the
civilian courts almost inevitably is drawn into question." Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Mii-
tary, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 187-88 (1962) (footnotes omitted).
73. There is, of course, some ambiguity as to whether Congress has "spoken" on the issue of
intramilitary tort liability. Conceivably, the UCMJ, and Article 138 in particular, should suffice as a
normative remedy for constitutional torts. But, in its operation, if not its language, Article 138 is
essentially a broad grant of discretion to individual military commanders (who have authority over the
complained-of commander) to grant ad hoc remedies. It is not a remedy specially tailored to constitu-
tional torts in the way the civil service remedy in Bush v. Lucas was "constructed step by step with
careful attention to conflicting policy considerations," and therefore an adequate substitute for a Biv-
ens remedy. 462 U.S. at 388. See supra note 23.
74. The Constitution vests in Congress the authority "[tlo make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces," art. I, § 8, cl. 14, and makes the president Commander-in-
Chief of the armed forces, Art. II, § 2, cl. 1. Arguably-and the Chappell court implies just this
argument-these provisions are adequate to ensure control of the military by civilian constitutional
norms. But such an argument is seriously flawed.
Congressional rulemaking authority over the armed forces' internal justice system usually amounts
to grants of discretion to the executive or the military itself. For example, punishments for court-
martial offenses are left indeterminate by the UCMJ and are set by the executive-promulgated Man-
ual for Courts Martial. Also, certain court-martial offenses are themselves worded with extreme
vagueness by congressional statute. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 933 (1983) ("conduct unbecoming an officer
and a gentleman" punishable by court-martial); see also Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 773-83 (1974)
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (attacking 10 U.S.C. § 933 for vagueness and overbreadth). Executive branch
civilians do not necessarily impose the rule of the Constitution on the military either. See supra note
45.
Bivens and its progeny address these arguments squarely. The FBI is a civilian executive agency
under the rulemaking authority of Congress. Even so, the Bivens court held damages to be an appro-
priate remedy for citizens whose constitutional rights had been violated by FBI agents.
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forward.7 5 Such a rule can easily be fit into the existing system of civilian
public tort remedies.
A. A Less Restrictive Substitute for the Feres Doctrine
The foregoing analysis suggests that two considerations are involved in
deciding whether a civilian adjudication of intramilitary tort claims should
be undertaken: how well the intramilitary remedial system would function
by itself to resolve a particular claim;78 and how discipline in particular
might be affected by a given claim. " I have argued that intramilitary
remedies are least able to redress intentional or constitutional tort claims 8
and that the military's discipline interest in barring intramilitary tort
causes of action is clearest when soldiers' obedience to commands is at
stake. 9 These arguments imply a rule that allows intramilitary tort
claims where 1) the plaintiff alleges more than simple negligence (an in-
tentional or constitutional tort)80 and 2) the plaintiff is not an active duty
75. The Eighth Circuit has developed a "refined" analytical framework to apply to Feres doctrine
cases. Besides looking at the duty status of the plaintiff, the court also asks whether the tortious
activity "served some military purpose or mission" and whether the trial would question an interac-
tion between officer and subordinate. Brown v. United States, 739 F.2d 362, 367-69 (8th Cir. 1984).
In Brown, a black national guard trainee was subjected to a "mock lynching" by several fellow
guardsmen, who tied a rope around his neck and actually lifted him off the ground by the rope before
releasing him. The victim subsequently went into a deep depression and finally shot himself in the
head, causing severe and permanent damage. His lawsuit was allowed on the ground that his assail-
ants were of the same rank; had his superiors been responsible, his claim would have been dismissed
under this "refined" test. See also Stubbs v. United States, 744 F.2d 58 (1lth Cir. 1984) (no cause of
action for surviving family of female private who committed suicide after being sexually assaulted by
drill sergeant because command relationship was involved). Thus, this "refined" test completely fails
to address the problem of intentional torts committed by persons exploiting a command relationship.
76. A threshold determination concerning the adequacy of intramilitary remedies would have to
be made as a matter of law, as the Feres court arguably seems to have done. See 340 U.S. at 144-45
(approving system of "simple, certain and uniform compensation for injuries or death of those in the
armed services"). To base a determination of adequacy instead on a factual finding of failure of
intramilitary remedies would require judicial review of intramilitary determinations. But courts have
been reluctant to review the adequacy of Article 138 grievance decisions, and VA determinations are
not judicially reviewable on factual grounds. 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1982) (barring review on law or
fact); see Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974) (prohibition of judicial review of VA determina-
tions of fact or administrative law does not bar constitutional challenge to statute). The proposal
advanced in this Note obviates the need for a case-by-case judicial inquiry into the adequacy of in-
tramilitary determinations. See infra text accompanying notes 84-90.
77. The Feres doctrine implicitly takes these considerations into account with its "incident-to-
service" test, which uses the plaintiff's duty status as a proxy for a particularized inquiry into both the
adequacy of intramilitary remedies and the strength of the military's discipline interest. The "inci-
dent-to-service" issue has been litigated by many plaintiffs seeking to avoid the Feres bar, but has
been resolved in the plaintiff's favor in only a handful of negligence claims. See ZilIman, Intramilitary
Tort Law: Incidence to Service Meets Constitutional Tort, 60 N.C. L. REv. 489, 511 (1980) (in only
8 of 147 cases litigating "incident-to-service" issue have plaintiffs avoided dismissal under Feres).
78. See supra text accompanying notes 37-42.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 58-67.
80. This should be understood to include such formulations as "willful," "wanton" or "reckless"
negligence. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OwFN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 212-13 (5th ed. 1984).
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service member."1 Claims of simple negligence or medical malpractice
2
would be dismissed at the pleading stage, 8 as would claims by active mili-
tary personnel or by former military personnel alleging injuries whose
effects did not last beyond discharge from the military.
The advantage of this approach is that it screens out insubstantial cases
while showing a measure of deference to intramilitary remedies and to the
military's interest in the obedience of active-duty personnel.
4 In order to
bring a tort action, an ex-soldier would have to allege a harm that was so
serious that its effects were still felt after his or her discharge from the
military.8 5 The actual operation of internal military investigations would
not be impugned by judicial factual review, because the Article 138 griev-
ance procedure is not available to former soldiers
8 or civilian family
members. Nor would the adequacy of veterans' compensation be explicitly
challenged. The intentional or constitutional tort requirement of the pro-
posed rule operates, like the Feres doctrine, as a proxy for particularized
inquiry into the adequacy of intramilitary remedies, because it assumes
those remedies to be adequate for active-duty personnel, but not for
others. But unlike the Feres doctrine, this rule recognizes that intramili-
tary remedies cannot be expected to serve the public tort law interest in
compensation and deterrence when serious misconduct is alleged.
Under my proposal, the military would retain control over resolution of
the range of claims whose effects are contained within the duration of
military service.5 7 On the other hand, intramilitary claims alleging harms
81. This formulation includes survivors of deceased military personnel, as well as family members
who can allege harms to themselves that have their "genesis" in intramilitary tort. See cases cited
supra note 17.
82. See, e.g., Feres, 340 U.S. 135; Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949).
83. Thus, Feres, limited to its original facts, need not be overruled.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 58-67
85. The statute of limitations should not begin to run until discharge from the military, because
only then would an intramilitary tort victim have a cause of action under the proposal. However, in
cases such as Jaffe and Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979), where the
government allegedly concealed its wrongdoing, the statute of limitations should be tolled further,
until the victim discovers (or should have discovered) that he or she has been harmed by military
superiors. See Note, Citizen Trust and Government Cover-up: Refining the Doctrine of Fraudulent
Concealment, 95 YALE L.J. (forthcoming, June, 1986) (government's superior power and information
and public interest in trusting government justify lenient statute of limitations period for citizen tort-
plaintiffs where government has concealed wrongdoing).
86. See Dep't of the Army Regulation AR 27-14, 1-2(a), 3-2(3)(a) (Art. 138 complainant must
be on active duty in federal service); see also Colson v. Bradley, 477 F.2d 639 (8th Cir. 1973) (Art.
138 remedy, normally unavailable to non-military personnel, would not be denied plaintiff whose
grievance was his wrongful discharge from military); Rasmussen v. Seamans, 432 F.2d 346 (10th Cir.
1970) (Art. 138 not available to Colorado Air National Guard member not on active duty in federal
service).
87. See, e.g., Tigue v. Swaim, 585 F.2d 909 (8th Cir. 1978) (affirming summary judgment for
military defendant). In Tigue, the plaintiff alleged that he had been subjected to a retaliatory psychi-
atric evaluation which resulted in his removal from his post and confinement in a mental ward for
twenty-two days. However, he was subsequently given a favorable psychiatric report, which intimated
that he had been subjected to retaliation, and he was promptly restored to his former status. Id. at
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which have a profound, long-term impact on the victims' lives would be
actionable.8" Moreover, the "habit of obedience" of active-duty personnel
is less likely to be affected by extending a right of action to ex-soldiers and
family members.8" Finally, this approach is consistent with the principle,
recognized by the federal courts, that the strictures that military authority
places on the citizen-soldier should be limited both to the time and to the
sphere in which the citizen actually serves as soldier.9
912. Tigue presents a clear case of injury that is contained within the plaintiffs term and sphere of
service.
88. Like any reform, the one proposed here is not perfect. As the price of deference to military
discipline, it would continue to deny active duty service members civilian redress for present harms
while they are still in the service. And it would at times permit sanctions even where the intramilitary
justice system may also have imposed sanctions; though the prospect of "double" sanctions would be
reduced as the deterrent effect of civil damage remedies modified military behavior. On balance, these
problems are outweighed by the benefits of allowing remedies for more egregious cases of intramili-
tary tort while maintaining deference to military needs for discipline.
89. See In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 580 F. Supp. 1242, 1250 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) ("The fact that an officer might refrain from giving an order to the soldier because a civilian
might ultimately sue the United States is so ephemeral and far-fetched that it is given no weight at all
in determining the limits of Feres.").
90. The "incident-to-service" rule seems to acknowledge the necessity of limiting military author-
ity to active service. Thus, in Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949), two active-duty servicemen
on furlough were allowed to sue the United States after an army truck collided with their car on a
public highway. See also, United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954) (former servicemen allowed to
sue United States for post-discharge negligence of army doctors); Thornwell v. United States, 471 F.
Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979) (same). In Brown, the case that introduced the "discipline" rationale into
the Feres doctrine, "the peculiar and special relationship" between soldiers and the military ceased
with civilian status. 348 U.S. at 112. Cf. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969) (soldier's peace-
time criminal act outside of military base subject to trial and punishment by civilian and not military
criminal process); Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958) (per curiam) (army not allowed to issue
less-than-honorable discharges on basis of alleged pre-service subversive political activities); Stapp v.
Resor, 314 F. Supp. 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (same). See generally Sherman, supra note 64, at 574-80
(citing Vietnam era cases of judicial review of induction and discharge).
The Brown principle holds the government liable for post-discharge negligence in following up
service-related injuries. This rule has caused a curious development in circuit court decisions on
Atomic Veterans' litigation. Some federal courts have recently allowed FTCA claims against the gov-
ernment for a separate, post-discharge tort of negligent failure to warn servicemen of their exposure to
radiation, while at the same time holding that Feres required dismissal of related claims of exposure
to radiation and failure to warn the serviceman while he was still in the service. See Cole v. United
States, 755 F.2d 873 (11th Cir. 1985); Molsbergen v. United States, 757 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1985);
Broudy v. United States, 661 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1981) ("Broudy I"); Broudy v. United States, 722
F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1985) ("Broudy II"); Seveny v. United States, 530 F. Supp. 653, 660 (D.R.I.
1982). The litigation has thus been allowed to proceed to the next stage of FTCA inquiry-whether
the relationship between the government and the serviceman would give rise to state law liability for
failure to warn under analogous circumstances between private parties. See Molsbergen, 757 F.2d at
1020; Cole, 755 F.2d at 878; FTCA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2674, 1346(b) (1982) (parallel liability and local
law requirements). See also supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text (discussing these FTCA provi-
sions). The Molsbergen court actually went so far as to find that California law would hold employers
liable for failure to warn a discharged employee of exposure to dangerous substances. 757 F.2d at
1021-24.
The crucial issue in these cases becomes the time at which the government learned of the dangers of
radiation exposure, because the duty to warn arises from knowledge of the danger. If the government
learned of the danger while the victim was still in the service, the duty would have originated while
the injured serviceman was still in the armed forces, and a claim based on negligent failure to warn
would be barred under Feres. Cole, 755 F.2d at 876-77; see Heilman v. United States, 731 F.2d 1104
(3d Cir. 1984); Gaspard v. United States, 713 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1983); Lombard v. United States,
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B. Public Tort Law Context
Under the existing remedial system, citizens may sue federal officials
for tortious conduct under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
91 or sue
the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 2 But the FTCA,
without amendment, does not lend itself to an interpretation that would
allow suits for intentional torts committed by parties other than law en-
forcement officials." At present, the FTCA is "a niggardly waiver of fed-
eral governmental immunity," full of qualifications and exceptions.
4 In-
deed, the inadequacies of the FTCA as a remedy to compensate and deter
harms arising from a constitutional tort led the Supreme Court in Carl-
690 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Laswell v. Brown, 683 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1982). But if the govern-
ment learned of the danger, and thus incurred the duty, after the serviceman's discharge, then it
would be liable under the FTCA to the serviceman and his surviving family for negligent failure to
warn.
This curious line of decisions may be the result of judges' discomfort with the rigid unfairness of
Feres. In other areas of tort law, courts have accepted some doctrinal confusion in order to let particu-
larly deserving plaintiffs prevail. See Zacharias, supra note 44, at 716-24. But this particular doctri-
nal confusion underscores problems not only inherent in the Feres doctrine, but in the FTCA as well.
First, and most obviously, this line of cases holds that the government would be free from liability if it
had known the extent of radiation hazards when it subjected servicemen to the tests or shortly after,
prior to the servicemen's discharge-predsely the cases in which the government should be most
culpable.
Second, because the FTCA excludes liability for intentional torts (with the exception of intentional
torts of law enforcement agents), the government could avoid liability by showing that it intentionally
failed to warn ex-servicemen of radiation hazards as part of a cover-up-again, a case in which the
government is culpable.
Finally, the FTCA scheme imposes potential unfairness on military plaintiffs by subjecting them to
various state law standards. While California law, for example, supports liability on a duty to warn
theory, Molsbergen, 757 F.2d at 1023-24, Alabama law may not. See Cole, 755 F.2d at 878. The
unfairness and irrationality, identified by Feres and its progeny, of subjecting the soldier-government
relationship to varying state tort-law standards dependent on where a soldier happens to be stationed,
works both ways: Surely, military personnel deserve a uniform standard of care from their govern-
ment employer, regardless of where the government stations them, because that relationship is "dis-
tinctly federal." See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text. This fairness concern does not support
a blanket immunity rule as the Fetes court concluded, but rather the application of a federal common
law liability rule, such as that found in Bivens and its progeny.
91. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
92. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982).
93. See P. ScRucK, supra note 25, at 100-22. Certain reforms would be required to open the
FTCA to intramilitary intentional tort ciaims, including: a specific provision extending the govern-
ment's intentional tort liability; repeal of the state-law tort requirement and extension of government
liability to include constitutional torts; and lifting restrictions on attorneys fees and punitive damage
awards. Such reforms could make Bivens remedies unnecessary. See id.; Madden, Allard & Remes,
Bedtime for Bivens." Substituting the United States as Defendant in Constitutional Tort Suits, 20
HAtv. J. ON LE is. 469 (1983).
94. P. Scaumx, supra note 25, at 112-18; see, e.g., "discretionary functions" exception, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(a). The doctrinal contortions brought on by this exception are exemplified by Allen v. United
States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 338 (D. Utah 1984), which held that the "discretionary functions" excep-
tion would have barred claims of civilian radiation victims of nuclear testing only if the government
had consciously made a policy decision to use them as "human guinea pigs." However, precisely
because the court found that the government's negligent implementation of the testing was not in-
tended to use plaintiffs in that way, the injuries were actionable under FTCA.
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son v. Green 5 to imply a Bivens remedy even though FTCA recovery
was available. Because a Bivens action implicates federal common law, it
is not open to the objection, as an intramilitary tort claim under the
FTCA would be, that the federal government is subjected to various stan-
dards of liability to its military personel. And because a Bivens action
must allege the tortious violation of a constitutional right,96 the Bivens
action might screen out claims less deserving of the level of deterrence
generated by damage awards in federal court. Finally, a Bivens remedy
would require less modification of existing statute and case-law than
would an FTCA approach.9
CONCLUSION
Federal courts implementing the Feres doctrine have not necessarily in-
tended that injured service personnel should go uncompensated or that
wrongful, tortious conduct should be undeterred. Rather, the Feres deci-
sions have implied that the military compensation system and the mili-
tary's internal disciplinary and justice procedures can handle these tort-
law functions, and that they do so with a greater sensitivity to the mili-
tary's institutional needs than civilian courts can. Intramilitary remedies
are not, however, adequate across the range of intentional tort claims:
95. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
96. Federal officials appear to have absolute immunity from state law causes of action, whether
statutory or common law. This rule, derived from Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1958) (plurality
opinion) (defamation claim), was not altered by the decision in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478
(1978) (executive officials must overcome presumption against absolute immunity). See, e.g., Mir v.
Fosburg, 646 F.2d 342, 346 (9th Cir. 1980); Granger v. Marek, 583 F.2d 781, 784 (6th Cir. 1978).
Under qualified immunity doctrine, federal officials may be stripped of their immunity only for viola-
tions of federal statutory or constitutional provisions.
97. To change the Feres doctrine as proposed in this Note via the FTCA requires either legisla-
tion or a statutory construction that strains congressional intent. A Bivens remedy is less dependent,
jurisprudentially, on the will of Congress. See supra, notes 20, 69. Also, to imply a Bivens remedy
under the proposal advanced in this Note would not require that Chappell v. Wallace be overruled.
The Chappell facts do not provide the appropriate grounds for its sweeping holding-precluding (in
dicta at least) all Bivens remedies against intramilitary defendants-because the complaint was made
by active duty servicemen for harms whose effects may well have been contained within plaintiffs'
term of military service. Once a Bivens action is recognized, the court would consider the defendant's
entitlement to absolute immunity by making a particularized inquiry into the defendant's functions.
See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at 503; Tigue v. Swaim, 585 F.2d 909 (8th Cir. 1978).
In order for the proposal of this Note to be effective, the intramilitary tort cause of action should be
coupled with an approach to immunity principles that is liberal to plaintiffs. Absolute immunity could
be accorded, for example, only to officials making combat decisions and perhaps to officials whose
decisions directly relate to highly sensitive defense matters, such as nuclear weapons maintenance. See
Tigue, 585 F.2d 909. This type of line-drawing, it is true, would involve the courts in the very
decisions of military expertise that they now purposely avoid under Feres. But the lines can be drawn
with varying degrees of deference, with doubts resolved, if necessary, in favor of military immunity.
And because judges often weigh evidence of technical experts on subjects about which judges know
very little, it would not be out of line to permit military defendants at various stages in the litigation
to show that, for example, the challenged decision or action was taken pursuant to a function vital to
combat preparedness.
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Due to the internal, institutional pressures to conform or exhibit loyalty in
the military, cases involving particularly egregious or widespread military
misconduct are more appropriately resolved by civilian courts. In recog-
nizing causes of action by former servicemen and their families for alleged
intentional or constitutional torts, courts can show some deference to the
concerns underlying the Feres doctrine-the limited adequacy of in-
tramilitary remedies and the military's need to maintain obedience of its
personnel-while still allowing public tort remedies for misconduct
against citizen-soldiers.
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